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DR. ROY S. LEEt
The question posed is "Should there be an international tri-
bunal for crimes against humanity?" My answer is a definite
yes. Let me state the reasons.
First, I should like to point out that the development of in-
ternational law in the past century has been moving towards
that direction. The creation of an internationally-constituted
permanent tribunal to prosecute and punish international
crimes is, in my view, a natural progression of a process which
we started a long time ago.
Prior to the 18th century, the conduct of war was largely
unregulated. Excesses and acts of brutality were the normal
course of action in war. The first national code of conduct of war
was only introduced in 1863 by Frances Lieber for the United
States armies.' This was then followed by two international in-
struments- the 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of
the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field;2 and the
1874 Brussels Declaration concerning the laws and customs of
war.3 These instruments merely articulate certain standards
which were recommended for States to adopt. The concept of
violation or war crimes was non-existent.
More elaborate international instruments concerning laws
and customs of war only emerged at the 1899 and 1907 confer-
ences.4 These so-called Hague Rules were intended to be ap-
plied by the States themselves; there was no third party
enforcement. In this sense, they were self-regulating. Mecha-
nisms for dealing with violations were still at an embryonic
stage, let alone the question of prosecution and punishment.
t Dr. Lee has earned a law degree (in China), an L.L.M. from McGill
University and a Ph.D. in international Law from the University of London. He is
currently the Principal Legal Officer at the United Nations' Office of the Legal
Counsel and an adjunct professor at Pace University School of Law.
' President Lincoln Gen. Orders No. 100, Instructions For The Government
of Armies of the United States.
2 22 Stat. 940 (Senate Accession March 16, 1882).
3 Final Protocol: Rules of Military Warfare, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in
A.J.I.L., supp. 1:96.
4 Hague Convention, No. IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on
Land, Oct. 18, 1907. 36 Stat. 2277, T.IA.S., No. 539.
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Prosecution and punishment of war criminals became a re-
ality only in 1945 when the Allied Forces set up the Interna-
tional Military Tribunals to prosecute and punish the major
war criminals of the Axis. Several characteristics of the Tribu-
nals should be noted: (a) they were constituted by the victor
states to prosecute and punish war criminals of the vanquished;
(b) the Tribunals had no jurisdiction over war criminals of the
Allied Forces; (c) they were instituted after the war, long after
the crimes had already been committed; (d) the judges and pros-
ecutors were also appointed by the victor States. I mention
these characteristics only to facilitate a comparison with the
subsequently developed tribunals, to which I shall now turn.
Under the 1949 Geneva Conventions for the Protection of
War Victims, 5 States parties are legally obligated to enact legis-
lation necessary to provide effective penal sanctions for persons
committing any of the grave breaches laid down in the Conven-
tions. Each contracting party is also under an obligation to
search for persons alleged to have committed, or to have or-
dered to be committed "grave breaches", and to bring such per-
sons, regardless of their nationality before its own courts or to
hand over for trial such persons to another contracting party.
Grave breaches include wilful killing, torture or inhuman treat-
ment, wilfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body
or health, unlawful deportation, taking of hostages and exten-
sive destruction and appropriation of property items.6 Thus,
under the 1949 system, penal sanctions have been introduced to
prosecute and punish grave breaches in the court of the con-
tracting parties concerned. This is still a self-executing system
since the penal sanctions are to be applied by the contracting
parties concerned and in their own courts.
In comparison to the Nuremberg type, the Geneva system
has made important advancements have been made. First, a
universal jurisdiction has been created over the grave breaches.
Second, such jurisdiction may be exercised at any time when
such breaches have been committed. Third, penal sanctions are
to apply to all violators whether or not they belong to the victo-
rious or the vanquished. These are important departures from
the Nuremberg type.
5 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (Aug. 12, 1949).
6 Id.
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Let us now turn to the recent International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for serious violations of In-
ternational Humanitarian Law committed in the territory of
the Former Republic of Yugoslavia since 1991, created in 1993
by the Security Council pursuant to its resolution 827 (1993)
(hereinafter referred to as the International Tribunal).7 Here
again, we have made some advancement. First, this Tribunal,
the first of its kind, was created out of an international rage at
the widespread violations of international humanitarian law oc-
curring in former Yugoslavia. It represents a manifestation of
the world community at the tragedies committed in Yugoslavia.
It is therefore different from the previous types, which were in-
stituted either by the victor states or by the parties involved.
Second, it is an international tribunal in that its eleven judges
were elected by the General Assembly on behalf of the world
community, not by the parties involved. Third, it was estab-
lished under chapter VII of the UN Charter.8 This means that
the Tribunal is endowed, through the Security Council, with en-
forcement measures under which Member States are required
to comply with its request for judicial assistance. Fourth, while
the Tribunal is a subsidiary organ of the Security Council, its
work is to be conducted in accordance with its Statute.9 Hence,
it is a judicial body independent of political considerations and
is not subject to the authority or control of the Council, or of the
parties to the conflict.
Be that as it may, it should be noted at the same time that
this tribunal is an ad hoc one, its duration is limited to the res-
toration and maintenance of international peace and security in
the territory of the former Yugoslavia, and its jurisdiction is
also limited to crimes committed in that territory since 1991.
Consequently, its competence is limited in time, in subject mat-
ter and in the territory to which it applies.
I would now like to turn to the fourth type of tribunal which
is emerging and is being framed by the International Law Com-
mission (ILC). It may be recalled that in 1948 the General As-
sembly called upon the ILC to consider the desirability of
7 U.N. SCOR, U.N. Doe. S/25704, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1163 (1993). (Here-
inafter Statute of the Tribunal).
8 U.N. CHARTER art. 7.
9 Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 7.
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creating an international criminal court for the trial of persons
charged with genocide. 10 In 1950, the Commission called for
the establishment of such an institution but the drafting of its
statute was deferred pending agreement on a definition of ag-
gression and a Draft Code of Crimes Against the Peace and Se-
curity of Mankind.
While the definition of aggression was adopted by the As-
sembly in 1974,11 the Commission was not requested to resume
its work on this issue. In 1989, the Assembly revived the ques-
tion of setting up an international criminal jurisdiction in re-
sponse to a proposal from Trinidad and Tobago that an
international mechanism be developed with jurisdiction over in-
ternational drug traffickers. 12 The General Assembly re-
quested the ILC to consider this question in the context of the
"Draft Code of Crimes against the Peace and Security of
Mankind."
The Commission has now produced a 67-article draft stat-
ute of an international criminal court,' 3 and has submitted it to
the General Assembly. The institution currently envisaged by
the ILC is a permanent one consisting of a judicial organ i.e.,
the "Court" or "tribunal", a prosecutorial organ called
"procuracy", and an administrative arm called the "registry".
This permanent institution could be created by a multilateral
treaty to which all States become parties. There would be a
panel of eighteen judges to be elected by the States parties on
the basis of a set of criteria. The prosecutor and his deputy are
also to be elected by the States' parties. States, upon becoming
parties to the treaty, would be free to confer jurisdiction on the
court over such crimes as genocide, grave breaches, unlawful
10 GA.. Res. 260B, U.N. GAOR, 3rd Sess., 178 mtg. U.N. Doc. A/760, (Dec. 9,
1948).
11 G.A. Res. 3314, U.N. GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 142, U.N. Doc. At
9631 (1974).
12 Letter from the Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the
Secretary General, which requested the inclusion in the agenda of the 44th ses-
sion of the General Assembly of a supplementary item entitled "International
Criminal Responsibility of Individuals and Entities engaged in illicit trafficking in
narcotic drugs across national frontiers and other international criminals' activi-
ties: establishment of an international criminal court with jurisdiction over such
crimes." (Aug. 21, 1989) (A/441195).
23 S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 3175th mtg. (1993) (Deciding to establish Tribu-
nal); S.C. Res. 827, U.N. Doc. S/25626 (1993) (Approving Statute for the Tribunal).
[Vol. 6:93
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss1/11
SYMPOSIUM ON WAR CRIMES TRIBUNAL
seizure of aircraft, apartheid and hostage-taking as defined and
dealt with in various existing international legal instruments. 14
But each State party would also be allowed to confer jurisdic-
tion on the court in respect of other international crimes not
listed above.
ILC has suggested several alternative ways for States to
confer jurisdiction on the Court. One possibility would be to al-
low each State party to make a special declaration indicating
the kind of crimes to be covered; another way is to allow States
to select from a list of crimes embodied in the instrument.
Under the ILC draft, the Security Council would also be able to
use the court. This is to save it from establishing ad hoc tribu-
nals as the Security Council did in the case of former
Yugoslavia.
According to the ILC draft, the filing of a complaint by a
State party, for example, would trigger the preliminary phase of
the criminal procedure. There would be guarantees for trial
and impartiality of the tribunal. The court would pronounce
judgements and impose sentences. Procedures for appeal
against judgement or sentence would also be provided. These
are the characteristics of the kind of tribunal proposed by ILC.
It is an emerging type likely to be adopted by the General As-
sembly. In my view, such a permanent, international institu-
tion endowed with criminal jurisdiction over a wide range of
international crimes would represent a further development
from the previous and existing tribunals.
14 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of
Prisoners of War, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, 75 U.N.T.S.
31, 6 U.S.T. 3114; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, 75
U.N.T.S. 85, 6 U.S.T. 3217; Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civil-
ian Persons in Time of War, Dec. 9, 1948, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 6 U.S.T. 3516; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 11 U.N.T.S. 3;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft (Hijacking), 22
U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, reprinted in 10 I.L.M. 133, (1971); International
Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of Apartheid, G.A. Res. 3068,
U.N. GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, U.N. Doc. A19030 (1973); 1015 U.N.T.S. 243,
reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 50 (1974) International Convention against the taking of
Hostages, G. Res. 146, 34 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 46) 245, U.N. Doc. A/34146
(1980),reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1456 (1979).
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The above brief survey shows that we have been moving,
though slowly but steadily, towards an international criminal
court. During the initial period, we had no standards for gov-
erning hostilities. Every nation was free to do what it liked. In
the second period, we created certain basic standards but the
observance of such standards was purely voluntary and self-ex-
ecuting. In the third stage, we moved from standard-setting to
taking action against violations. Examples included the Nu-
remberg trials and the Geneva system of 1949 through the Nu-
remberg-type and the Geneva-Convention type, we have
progressed in 1993 to the ad hoc tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia. We are now in a fourth stage. All facts seem to point to
the creation of a permanent institution along the lines proposed
by the International Law Commission.
The existence of the first three types plus the fourth emerg-
ing type makes plain that the answer to the question posed is
yes. Their existence powerfully demonstrates the fact that the
community of nations has felt the need to do more than enunci-
ate rules and establish standards that must be obeyed. The
need is recognized to hold people to those rules and standards,
and for punishing them for violating those standards. Thus, it
seems to me, the establishment of an international criminal ju-
risdiction is a logical development of international law and an
inevitable natural progression of the world civilization.
I now turn to the second part of my presentation. Here, I
would like to respond to some of the criticisms put forward
against creating an international criminal tribunal in general,
and against the International Tribunal created by the Security
Council for the former Yugoslavia in particular. These argu-
ments will be dealt with here.
First, it has been argued that the subject matter is always
highly political. Out of political necessity, the top political lead-
ers may have to be excused even though they may be suspects of
criminal offenses. It would not be meaningful, it is hence ar-
gued, if an international criminal tribunal could only prosecute
and punish the middle or low ranking officers.
Reference has thus often referred to the case of the former
Yugoslavia. It has been contended that only a political solution
can bring peace to the Balkans and that a solution can only be
found through negotiations with the existing leaders of the re-
[Vol. 6:93
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spective entities now in Yugoslavia. Since some of them are al-
legedly the prime suspects of ordering war crimes, genocide,
and crimes against humanity, those leaders would not sign on
to any peace plan unless they would be exempted from possible
prosecution and punishment. If, to obtain a peace settlement,
prime suspects would have to be exempted, the International
Tribunal would serve no useful purpose.
It should be pointed out that it was Mr. Vance and Lord
Owen who first proposed and persuaded the Security Council to
create a tribunal to prosecute and punish war crimes in Yugo-
slavia. It would not be fair to assume that they, in fact, in-
tended to exonerate the leaders. Let me also refer to Article 7,
subparagraph 2 and 3 of the Tribunal's Statute.' 5 Article 7 of
the Statute deals with "individual criminal responsibility".
Subparagraph 2 clearly stipulates that "the official position of
any accused person whether a head of State or Government or
as a responsible government official, shall not relieue such per-
son of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment."16 Ac-
cordingly, under the Statute, no head of State or Government
may be exempted from criminal responsibility. Nor shall their
position be used to mitigate punishment.
Subparagraph 3 further provides that any punishable act
committed by a subordinate does not relieve his superior of
criminal responsibility.17 This means that no head of State or
Government can be exempted by invoking their official position
or by blaming their subordinates.
In my view, it is only proper that all persons who partici-
pate in the planning, preparation, or execution of war crimes in
the former Yugoslavia should be individually responsible. Such
persons should include heads of state, government officials and
persons acting in official capacity. A plea of head of state immu-
nity or an act committed in the official capacity of the accused
must not constitute a defense or be allowed to mitigate punish-
ment. Article 7 of the Statute makes that quite clear.' s I sub-
mit that this rule is, in fact, consistent with the Nuremberg
principle and forms part of customary international law. Con-
15 Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 7.
16 Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 7.
17 Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 7.
18 Statute of the Tribunal, supra note 7.
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sequently, I do not think that this argument can be used to deny
the creation of the international tribunal.
Another argument put forward against the creation of an
international tribunal is that in the absence of an international
police force, it is impossible, physically, to bring the war
criminals, particularly high-ranking officials, to trial. Refer-
ence has again been made to the situation in the former Yugo-
slavia: the territory and population of the former Yugoslavia
continue to be controlled by the governments and authorities
concerned; there are real difficulties in gathering evidence, in-
terviewing the victims and visiting places where war crimes are
allegedly committed. The execution of any order from the Inter-
national Tribunal would have to rely on the territorial States or
authorities concerned. Since the latter are unlikely to cooper-
ate, the accused cannot be seized, and there is no way to con-
duct any on-site investigation. Consequently, there would not
be any significant prosecution or trial.
It should be noted that according to the Statute of the Tri-
bunal, the Prosecutor has the full responsibility to initiate in-
vestigation ex-officio or on the basis of information obtained
from any source, particularly from governments, UN organs, in-
ter-governmental and non-governmental organizations. He
shall assess the information received or obtained and decide
whether there is sufficient basis to proceed. Upon the comple-
tion of the investigation, if the prosecutor has determined that a
prima facie case exists, he would prepare the indictment which
shall be reviewed by a trial judge, who shall decide whether to
continue or dismiss the incident.
Upon confirmation of the indictment, the judge may, at the
request of the Prosecutor, issue an order or warrant for the
arrest, detention, surrender, or transfer of persons. Since the
Statute of the Tribunal was adopted by the Security Council
under Chapter VII, this means that the Statute is automatically
binding and enforceable in all the territories of the member
States of the United Nations. Consequently, any order or in-
dictment for arrest, detention, surrender or transfer of persons
issued by the Tribunal are also automatically binding on all
Member States. The critical effect is that once such an indict-
ment or order is issued, the indicted person becomes a prisoner
of the world. States would be legally obligated to arrest and
[Vol. 6:93
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detain them and hand them over to the Tribunal. If the territo-
rial State which the accused is in chooses not to comply with the
warrant, they are physically prevented from moving outside
that State, for if they do, they will be arrested and detained by
other States. If the accused is a head of state or government, it
will almost be impossible for them to conduct any diplomacy ef-
fectively. They would become an international outcast. They
would be arrested, detained and tried if ever they step outside
their country. The Statute of the Tribunal has thus created a
procedure which can be used effectively to constrain the accused
persons even if they cannot be arrested, detained or tried imme-
diately. While this is still far from perfect, it is no different
from our experience under the national system when criminals
are not captured.
A third argument often put forward against the creation of
the Tribunal is that punishment does not deter or prevent
crimes. Opponents have contended that criminologists have
long established that punishment has little value in preventing
crimes. War criminals, it is argued, are usually motivated by
their political conviction and no punishment, however severe,
could change their minds. Again, they refer to the present situ-
ation in the former Yugoslavia as an example.
To punish the criminals is certainly one of the purposes for
creating an international tribunal, but it should not be the only
purpose. Much broader and important objectives are at stake.
For the longest time, international law has been criticized
for its lack of enforcement; it has not been regarded as law by
some. While I believe that international law exists on its values
and that the want for more effective sanctions does not negate
the validity of international law. The creation of a permanent
international tribunal would be a step forward and would help
to strengthen international law.
Since World War II, numerous atrocities and war crimes
have been committed. Numerous reports and investigations
have been publicized. But with the exception of the Nuremberg
and Tokyo trials, none of the other findings went through an
international judicial process. It is certainly not my intention to
downgrade the value of those reports and investigations. The
point is that short of a judicial process, the findings are always
subject to challenge. This is the first time since 1945 that a
1994]
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competent international tribunal on behalf of the world commu-
nity will be making pronouncements through a judicial process
on the illegality of acts committed. Here lies the value and jus-
tifies, in my view, the existence of an international tribunal.
In light of the above, I have no hesitation in responding
with a positive yes.
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol6/iss1/11
